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Abstract
The notion of secularization as an incompatibility between modernization and religion 
derives from the analysis of the process of modernization of Western European 
societies. This process led to a weight loss of religion in society and to a progressive 
differentiation of social spheres, such as religion, politics, science, etc. Following on 
from this analysis the category and the theory were extended to take on a universal 
scope in order to describe the modernization processes that would occur in other 
societies. From the very beginning, sociology has provided exceptions to the rule 
of secularization. The first was noted by de Tocqueville: American exceptionalism. 
Then came the processes of rapid economic growth of some Asian Pacific countries 
(Japan, Korea, Singapore, etc.). Progressively, the entry of new countries into the 
field of interest of sociologists is showing the Eurocentric nature of the concept. 
The case of Western Europe, which was the rule, became the exception. Even the 
notion of religion as a separate social sphere is considered by some social scientists 
to be ethnocentric. Despite its previous Eurocentrism, the notion of secularization 
remains useful for sociologists. It has served to account for European religious 
change, and its analytical instruments can be applied to other cases and may be useful 
for interpreting these cases either with regard to how they adhere to the Western 
European model, or how they differ from it – still further, if we consider the huge 
extent of contemporary international migration. If sociologists want to understand 
the new Western European societies, they must reapply this analytical rather than 
predictive version of the concept.
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Introduction
The concept of the secularizing society has undergone many different historical transfor-
mations. As a sociological idea, secularization is the process pertaining to modern socie-
ties whereby religious doctrines and organizations experience diminished social influence 
because of the expansion of rationalism, science and technology that accompanies the 
process of industrialization and urbanization. This is a complex process that entails many 
individual, social and political dimensions within religion (Tschannen, 1992). The soci-
etal secularization thesis owes a great deal to learned ideas regarding the progress of 
human reason. It was developed as a theoretical argument during the 19th century, and as 
a part of the thought regarding the passing of traditional society. It was this analysis of 
the process of modernization that in turn was the very origin of the discipline of classic 
sociology. The reflection on the decline of religion in modern society is essential to the 
development of European sociology and remained intrinsic to it until the 1970s (Swatos 
and Christiano, 1999; Swatos and Olson, 2000). The concept of secularization was not as 
pronounced within American sociology due to the different model of modernization 
experienced by a country formed by successive migrations with diverse religious tradi-
tions. The need to accommodate the coexistence of many different religious creeds early 
on in the United States precluded the formation of a national Church.
The notion of secularization derives from the analysis of the process of modernization 
of Western European societies, leading to a progressive differentiation or separation 
between the various social spheres (religion, politics, science, marketplace, etc.); after 
this analysis the category and the theory were extended to take on a universal scope in 
order to describe the modernization processes that would occur in other societies. From 
very early on we see the emergence of exceptions to the supposed universality and tran-
shistoricity of the notion and the theory, which progressively weaken the scope of its 
validity. Despite this Eurocentrism of the notion, it continues to have its uses because: (1) 
it has served to account for European religious change; (2) its analytical instruments can 
be applied to other cases, and may be useful for interpreting these cases either with 
regard to how they adhere to the Western European model, or how they differ from it. In 
this sense, sociologists must try to define more clearly the main analytical meanings of 
secularization, not in order to predict social phenomena in other societies, but to be able 
to use these meanings for an empirical analysis of their religious change. Other societies 
may or may not have levels of secularization; religion may or may not be separate from 
other spheres, and may or may not have lost importance in individuals’ consciousness 
and behaviours; all this is significant material for analysis. Even at this micro level within 
Western European societies it is worth making a number of observations, as the loss of 
the importance of religion may not go hand in hand with a decline in religiosity or spir-
ituality; and the decrease in individual religion may be accompanied by the emergence 
and success of new religious movements (Stark, 1993) (3). This analytical development 
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of the notion can be applied to the analysis of the new situations occurring in Western 
European countries in general, and particularly as a consequence of immigration (spe-
cifically in the last quarter of the 20th century) from countries in which the differentia-
tion of spheres has not occurred so patently as in the destination countries. This produces 
a desecularization in the destination countries, but, as indicated by Hammond and 
Shibley (1993), it represents not a return to an earlier situation, but a new phenomenon 
that requires analysis.
This way of approaching the concept highlights the fact that the theory of seculariza-
tion is not a general theory of religious change, nor is it a universal theory, for the follow-
ing two reasons: it cannot be applied in every case; and in the cases where it is useful, it 
does not consider the entire spectrum of changes that occur.
The concept of secularization in sociology
The term secularization had a long history before appearing in sociology. ‘The medieval 
dichotomous classification of reality into religious and secular realms’ was undermined 
by four processes that led to western modernity: ‘the Protestant Reformation; the forma-
tion of modern states; the growth of modern capitalism; and the early modern scientific 
revolution’ (Casanova, 1994: 20–21). The Enlightenment, in the 18th century, brought an 
awareness of the progressive disappearance of religion from society. Sociology, in the 
19th and 20th centuries, developed this idea further by analysing the processes of mod-
ernization within European societies (Casanova, 1994: Ch. 1; Dianteill and Löwy, 2005; 
Hervieu-Léger and Willaime, 2001; Nisbet, 1974; Shiner, 1967; Turner, 1996).
The emerging social sciences in the 19th century collaborated actively in the process 
of nation-state building of European secular societies (Lefort, 2006). Sociologists’ par-
ticipation in this process is the reason why secularization was classified as an irreversible 
social process but never as an ideology or as a political project or movement. Certain 
anthropologists appreciated ‘that secularism is not a disenchanted political stand that 
consists of abstract principles and that the promotion of secularism is not an innocuous 
plea for public neutrality vis-à-vis the plurality of beliefs and worldviews. Secularism is 
carried by social actors with specific interests who associate it with concrete lifestyles, 
emotionally identify with it, sacralize it in the image of the state and of the founding 
fathers, performatively display their adherence to it, and mobilize against religious 
movements through complex strategies’ (Gorski and Altinordu, 2008: 73; see also Asad, 
2003, 2006; Navaro-Yashin, 2002). As Beckford (2003) said, many early sociologists 
were involved in political and practical schemes to clarify, obstruct or assist the decline 
of religion’s significance.
The most important sociologists of the 19th and early 20th centuries prophesized the 
future decline of religious institutions, but also foresaw a conceptual and very important 
analytical device for us to understand the changes in the role that religion plays in soci-
ety. Later, in the 1970s, Bell warned us that a simple and linear notion of secularization 
could no longer be admitted as an inexorable quantitative disappearance of religious 
beliefs, but that we should consider instead secularization to be something complex and 
multiple and not necessarily universal (Bell, 1977). The time had come to discuss the 
assumption that the relationship between modernism and religion is necessarily 
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conflictual. Some, at one extreme, advocated that the thesis of secularization should be 
abandoned definitively (Stark, 1999); for others, at the other extreme, it remained valid, 
although in need of some revision. And in the middle, there were more and more propo-
nents of a review of religion’s relationship with its social environment: ‘modern religion 
is resilient and subject to cultural influences; it does not merely survive or decline, but 
adapts to its environment in complex ways’ (Wuthnow, 1988: 475).
Dimensions of secularization
Bellah (1964) constructs an evolutionary typology that underscores the importance of a 
series of aspects that are implicit in the notion of religion and religious change as envis-
aged by European sociology. This typology is sustained by the notion of the progressive 
functional differentiation of society in general, particularly along the lines of developing 
symbolic differentiation, based on Voegelin’s (1956) fundamental idea that society 
evolves from compactly symbolized forms into differentiated forms. Bellah distinguishes 
five fundamental historical types. The first two are primitive and archaic religions, cor-
responding to barely differentiated forms of society. In the primitive type there is no 
differentiated religious organization: Church and Society are one and the same; while in 
the archaic type the religious organization is amalgamated with other social structures. 
Cosmological monism occurs in both the primitive and archaic types. The rupture of this 
monism, through the discovery of a field of religious reality, is precisely the main char-
acteristic of historic religion, the third type. This represents the appearance of rejection 
of this world, of the mundane, while characterizing religious action as something that is 
requisite to the individual’s salvation. This differentiated religious organization is distin-
guished from the political organization and hierarchy, and also implies that the problem 
of legitimizing political power has entered a new phase: there is now the possibility that 
political acts can be judged in religious terms. Early modern religion is the fourth type. 
The advent of religious modernism derives from the Protestant Reformation, whose fun-
damental characteristic was the collapse of the hierarchical structuring of the two worlds. 
We should not search for salvation in withdrawal from this world but instead at the centre 
of worldly activities. The fifth and final type, modern religion, is generically character-
ized by Bellah as the collapse of dualism, so crucial to historical religions. But this would 
not mean the return to archaic or primitive monism. Bellah characterizes as profoundly 
intellectual the quest for understanding modern religious symbolization. Kant is at the 
core of this reflection having posited that there are not merely two dichotomous religious 
and secular realms, but rather as many worlds as there are ways of apprehending them. 
At the level of mass religion, it is not clear whether individuals actually require cognitive 
harmony, i.e. internal consistency in their beliefs.
The evolutionary nature of this typology should serve as a cautionary note. It is per-
haps more valuable for understanding the historical development of religion within the 
Occident than such processes within non-western societies; nonetheless, all types have 
intrinsic analytical interest. Furthermore, as we know, even within western contexts, the 
institutionalization and meaning of religion changes over time. In particular, the separa-
tion of religion from other institutions has been the result of a historical process. When 
we examine non-western societies, it might be that their religion is not segregated from 
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such other institutions as culture, knowledge and politics. In the present western socie-
ties, when individuals and institutions from diverse religious backgrounds come into 
contact there is the strong possibility of misunderstanding and tension. In France, for 
example, when a young immigrant wears her Islamic veil, as far as the French are con-
cerned she is displaying a religious symbol (Roy, 2010). Nevertheless, to forbid her dress 
is, for her community, the proscription of an undifferentiated symbol that is simultane-
ously religious, cultural, family-based and political. At the heart of the matter is the 
danger of employing the category of religion ethnocentrically, as we shall see in the final 
section.
Successive exceptions to the rule of secularization
The sociological thesis of the contradiction between modernism and religion has under-
gone a series of historical periods, each of which comes up with an exception to the rule 
until contemporary times, when secularization became the exception and the survival of 
religion became the rule. A first exception to the idea of the contradiction between 
modernity and religion which dominated classical sociological thought was highlighted 
by de Tocqueville in De la démocratie en Amérique (1835–1840). When faced with the 
thesis that religion and modernism are incompatible, he always invoked as the exception 
the case of the United States (de Tocqueville, 1981). Its religiosity was one aspect of so-
called American exceptionalism (Bellah, 1967; Ross, 1984; Tyrrell, 1991). The US, 
despite being an industrialized, urbanized, rationalized society, is also characterized by 
its ‘periodical mass or public renewals of the religious life and, stemming from 
Puritanism, … the diffusion of religious elements to other social contexts. … The three 
major religious orientations – Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism – not only fill an 
important niche as providers of social identity but also have found in the United States 
an exceptional historical setting’ (Tiryakian, 1993: 40).
The economic development of some Asian Pacific countries (Japan, Korea, Singapore, 
etc.) has provided good reason to rethink the relationships between religion and modern-
ism. These countries, which currently have such powerful economies, have become 
westernized, although it is no less true that despite this they are not western. For exam-
ple, Dore has demonstrated substantial differences between Japan and the West, differ-
ences which themselves account for the Japanese economic miracle, and in so doing he 
has shown that individualism is not a necessary condition for modernism (Dore, 1992). 
All of these countries have incorporated their traditions into modernism. This leads us to 
conclude that the value of the classic secularization theory was not so much in its ability 
to describe all reality but its utility in the analysis of certain historical societies.
Considering the cases of the aforementioned countries, as well as those of the two 
large contemporary Asian economies, India and China, we can identify one of the key 
factors for rethinking the theory of secularization in our times: to reassess, at the same 
time, the theory of modernization. The most recent reviews converge upon the conclu-
sion, posited in detail by Eisenstadt (1998, 2000, 2001), that there are many paths to 
modernity. The ‘modern patterns, different in many radical ways from the “original” 
European ones (Martin, 1979), crystallized not only in non-Western societies, … but also 
– indeed first of all – within the framework of the Western expansion in societies in 
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which seemingly purely Western institutional frameworks developed – in the Americas’ 
(Eisenstadt, 2001: 4–5).
Europe: The rule which becomes the exception
There is currently a convergence (Berger, 1992; Davie, 2001; Hervieu-Léger, 1996, 
2001; Martin, 1996) towards the consideration of Europe ‘as the only geographic and 
cultural area (maybe alongside Canada) in which the typical ideal schema of seculariza-
tion as the expulsion of religion can be applied, as opposed to the other continents, 
including the United States’ (Hervieu-Léger, 2001: 7). Paradoxically, Peter Berger 
(1967), one of the most relevant contemporary theoreticians of secularization, recently 
produced the following diagnosis of the situation of religion in our world in general and 
in Europe in particular: ‘The current world is massively religious; it is anything but the 
secularized world which had been announced by so many modernity analysts. There are 
two exceptions to this proposal. … The first apparent exception is Western Europe, 
where the old theory of secularization seems to still be applicable. … The other excep-
tion is much less ambiguous: there is an international sub-culture of people who have 
received Western style higher education, particularly in humanities and social sciences, 
which is actually secularized’ (Berger, 2001: 24–26).
Grace Davie, based on surveys from 1986 and 1990 by the EVSSG (European Values 
Systems Study Group), proposes as a general trend in Europe the progressive weakening 
of religious practice, institutional adhesion and acceptance of traditional religious beliefs. 
However, she then adds that the clearest difference that occurs within Europe is the sepa-
ration of the Catholic countries in the South, which are more religious (with the excep-
tion of France) from the Protestant countries in the North, which are less religious (with 
the exceptions of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland) (Davie, 2001: 108–109). 
This means that while there is discernible secularization in both regions, it was earlier 
and stronger in the North than in the South (with the aforementioned exceptions).
Catholic countries in the South of Europe have formed a zone of greater resistance to 
religious and political modernization, with both dimensions being broadly connected 
(Pérez-Agote, 2012b). Furthermore, analysis of countries in this area has led to interest-
ing theoretical formulations: religious culture (Hervieu-Léger, 2003), implicit religion 
(Nesti, 1990), religious ground base (Bellah, 1980) and diffuse religion (Cipriani, 1989). 
The case of France is special: in classifications, it is sometimes included among coun-
tries with a Catholic tradition (Davie, 1996) while at others it is considered as the 
uniquely laïcal country par excellence (Stoetzel, 1983).
The persistence of religion in Western Europe
It is true – as maintained by Grace Davie – that Western Europe is undergoing a strong 
downward trend in religious practice, adhesion to institutions and acceptance of beliefs, 
all of which affect the dominant confessions in these countries. However it is equally true 
that new processes and trends have also arisen and are shaping the religious landscape in 
these countries. Casanova, in 1984, highlighted four important aspects of the persistence 
of religion in the western world. The first involved the new religious movements that 
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emerged from the counterculture of the 1960s, primarily in the United States but also in 
Europe; their social breeding ground was among the most educated and financially well-
placed sectors of the population, and their ideas were predominantly linked to a Christian 
tradition, which set them apart from the religious revivals frequently seen in American 
society. The second aspect of the religious renewal outlined by Casanova is the resur-
gence of Protestant fundamentalism in the United States; this new fundamentalism tends 
to sacralize the bourgeois values inherent in the liberal phase of capitalism and thus also 
inclines towards the dismantling of state interventionism. In 1972 Kelley had already 
indicated that while the five main Protestant families that were fundamental to the ecu-
menical movement of the day were in decline, the conservative branches of certain 
denominations were gaining in importance at the same time (Kelley, 1986: 17–35). 
Iannaccone, following his rational choice assumptions, demonstrated how ‘the strength 
of strict churches is neither a historical coincidence nor a statistical artifact. Strictness 
makes organizations stronger and more attractive because it reduces free riding. It screens 
out members who lack commitment and stimulates participation among those who 
remain. Rational choice theory thus explains the success of sects, cults, and conservative 
denominations without recourse to assumptions of irrationality, abnormality, or misin-
formation’ (Iannaccone, 1994: 1180). The third aspect mentioned by Casanova concerns 
the phenomenon of the renewal of the great historical official Churches. The author 
illustrates his case with the various renewal operations undergone by the Catholic 
Church, namely the Second Vatican Council, and liberation theology which emerged 
against the backdrop of Latin America. In fourth place he refers to what is known as the 
‘human potential movement’, which comprises a series of psychologizing practices dedi-
cated to developing individual well-being and equilibrium. This case also includes a 
number of regressions to archaic forms of religiosity (astrology, spiritualism, occultism, 
Satanism, etc.), and – more significantly – the substantial growth in what Luckmann 
(1967) has termed ‘invisible religion’ (Casanova, 1984). These three forms (the human 
potential movement, regressions to archaic forms and invisible religion) constitute a 
trend towards what could be described as the ‘individualization of religion’.
To gain a complex vision of the process of secularization in the West we need to 
examine the different ways in which religion has lost its importance in the individual 
sphere. This is the fourth aspect raised by Casanova. A first form is the disappearance of 
religion from the symbolic individual universe: individuals who totally abandon religion 
or new generations of individuals who have no dealings with religion at all. A second 
form is the one theorized by Luckmann (1967) in The Invisible Religion: within indi-
vidually maintained forms of religiosity, he distinguishes between those that are not ori-
ented towards a Church and those that are. This distinction between religion and Church 
(Besecke, 2005) thus becomes central, and the fact that the strength of the various 
Churches is in decline (Chaves, 1994) does not necessarily imply that the same is true of 
religion. Invisible religion may exist without any reference to a specific Church or creed, 
and there may also be invisible religion in people who have gradually disassociated 
themselves from the religion they used to profess and from its corresponding Church, 
and have arrived at a more or less indeterminate religious situation.
This last case has been theorized in Europe in terms of ‘believing without belonging’. 
Voas and Crockett maintain that this expression, coined by Grace Davie (1990, 1994), 
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‘has become the catchphrase of much European work on religion in the past decade’, 
referring to the 1990s (Voas and Crockett, 2005: 11). The proportion of believers in 
Europe has probably decreased less than the proportion of individuals who belong to 
different and corresponding religious confessions. If this is so, then generally speaking 
Europeans have conserved their belief in God and their religious (or, at least spiritual) 
sensibility; but their religious practice, as an indicator of belonging, has declined more 
substantially. This formulation comes up against two deep-seated problems. The first is 
that an individual’s belief in God and religious or spiritual sensibility may not be associ-
ated with the specific religion and Church to which he or she belonged in the past; the 
term ‘belief’ may refer to a specific historic and institutionalized religion, or to some-
thing which involves the supernatural, or the spiritual at the extreme, without reference 
to a specific and institutionalized set of beliefs. The second problem involves determin-
ing what the indicators of belonging to a specific institution are. ‘At least outside the 
boundaries of religion, no one expects assent to any given view to be matched by active 
membership in a relevant organization’ (Voas and Crockett, 2005: 13). There are various 
ways of expressing belonging; without doubt one way is participation in rituals of main-
tenance, which we normally call religious practice; but there are weaker or less active 
forms of manifestation of belonging, such as the mere statement by an individual of 
belonging to a specific religion. A variant of this last form could be a response to a ques-
tion on belonging in a survey. Belonging to an institution is not a clear and simple phe-
nomenon. In the first place it should be said that different forms may imply different 
degrees of belonging. Hirschman (1970: Chs 7 and 8) proposes three basic forms: loy-
alty, exit and internal opposition and protest; but there is also obviously a wide spectrum 
of possible intermediate forms and processes of internal change towards the institution.
Here we need to distinguish between maintaining beliefs and maintaining a coded 
set of beliefs, since the latter implies a greater degree of practice and belonging than 
the first.
What lies at the heart of the meaning of the expression ‘believing without belonging’ 
is the issue of orthodoxy. A religious creed, controlled by an institution called ‘the 
Church’, requires, in order to maintain itself without any substantial modifications, the 
attendance of believers at its rituals of maintenance; the increasing drop-off in attend-
ance by believers at these rituals leads to an increasing heterodoxy in the original creed. 
Thus the expression ‘believing without belonging’ is misleading, as it may lead to the 
impression that belief (its maintenance in terms of orthodoxy) is independent of 
practice.
An alternative formulation to the juxtaposition of belief and belonging derives from 
the notions of ‘religious culture’ and ‘exculturation’ (Hervieu-Léger, 2003). Some 
European countries with a Catholic religion have gradually evolved into countries with a 
Catholic culture. Religious practice is declining in these countries, and the orthodoxy of 
the creed is being eroded to the point that belief in certain elements of the Catholic creed 
is dying out, while belief in others persists. What is disappearing is the belief in the creed 
as a total entity; and this creed is the symbolic capital of the institution we call the 
Church, which therefore guards it zealously. Religion, a specific religious creed, has an 
institutionalization, whereas culture – understood here as the plurality of a series of 
shared meanings within a social reality – has a much weaker level of institutionalization. 
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There is no single visible institution charged with safeguarding the maintenance of cul-
ture, although there are many concerned with safeguarding the maintenance of parcels of 
culture. Culture, in general, is maintained by the pure and simple use that individuals 
make of it. For this reason, in France or Spain, for example, the preserved beliefs that 
derive from the Catholic creed, insofar as they are maintained without reference to the 
ecclesiastical institution, have now become part of the culture, without ecclesiastical 
mediation; and they are as much a part of the culture as other elements that come from 
science, politics or other spheres of society (Pérez-Agote, 2012a: 119–125; Swartz, 
1996).
The notion of Catholic culture opens up the possibility of exploring how the gradual 
weakening of religion may persist in the phenomenon that Hervieu-Léger, discussing the 
French case, has termed ‘exculturation’; this is the ‘process whereby, beyond the mani-
fest decline in the Church’s influence in society, the profane culture is losing its Catholic 
fabric’ (2003: 87). The underlying process is decatholization, which is practically equiv-
alent to a decrease in religious observance. Exculturation is a process in which culture, 
in the sense of shared representations, gradually loses its religious roots; religion has 
permeated a society’s culture; culture has become detached from its strictly religious 
nature, but this culture continues to be infused by religion. The next step is the progres-
sive loss of the Catholic roots of that culture. The notions of religious culture and excul-
turation have also been applied in the Spanish case, where the notions of family, work 
and profession, and the representation of death itself, have lost their religious roots in 
young people of recent generations (Pérez-Agote, 2012a: 138–139, 323–324).
These aspects appear to endorse Wilson’s idea that individual secularization is the 
process whereby the ‘Churches are losing influence over the ideas and activities of men’ 
(1969: 22). If we accept this definition, we also accept the idea that individual seculariza-
tion does not necessarily imply the disappearance of religion from people’s lives; when 
this disappearance does occur, secularization occurs; but secularization also occurs 
when, without disappearing, individuals cease to be controlled in the sphere of their ideas 
and behaviours by a Church, and religiosity is transferred to the purely individual realm. 
On the other hand, secularization does not occur when a Church ceases to have control 
over certain individuals because they create their own institution (religious protest move-
ments) or convert to another Church. Thus individual secularization could be defined as 
the death or deinstitutionalization of religion.
To the four aspects of the social life in Western Europe mentioned by Casanova, we 
could now add two new types of phenomenon that have had a profound effect on the 
religious landscape of the area since the last quarter of the 20th century.
In the first place, this period has seen an intensification in transnational immigration. 
The so-called oil crisis drastically altered the conditions of the immigrant population 
already present and the entry conditions for future immigrants. In addition, the fall of the 
Soviet empire triggered a strong trend in the population of Eastern Europe to emigrate to 
the West. Since the recent turn of the century the countries of Southern Europe have 
become receiving countries. The immigrant population has thus continued to rise, and to 
contribute to the process of religious pluralization in Western Europe. The economic 
hardships that have accompanied certain phases of this process have had significant con-
sequences on the conditions of social integration for people of immigrant origin, and this 
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has no doubt substantially modified the social uses that this population makes of its origi-
nal religion in terms of cultural identity and pragmatic solidarity. Some religions that 
were previously unknown in Western Europe have come to form part of the European 
religions, thus shattering the traditional religious homogeneity of these countries (Kepel, 
1987; Lamine, 2004; Roy, 2005). This heralds a new religious plurality in European 
countries. Also at this time the new 1965 immigration law in the United States repealed 
the restrictive laws of the 1920s, thereby recovering the old immigrant tradition of the 
19th century. However the origins of this new influx were significantly different: Latin 
America, Asia and, increasingly, all the regions in the world (Casanova, 2007: 59). These 
new transnational migratory currents have had very different social and political conse-
quences on each side of the Atlantic, in view of the dissimilar cultural, political and 
religious traditions prevailing on each shore (Banchoff, 2007; Berger, 2007; Wuthnow, 
2007).
A look at Western Europe highlights one of the general consequences that has occurred 
due to the inflow of population from societies with a clearly lower level of subjective 
secularization, and where the degree of separation and differentiation between culture 
and religion is limited or even non-existent. This has created specific conflicts in the 
cultural and religious field. Nowadays, symbols that are regarded as religious by the 
native population constitute religious-cultural-political symbols (all at the same time) in 
a population that has not undergone the same process of social differentiation as in 
Western Europe. The modern idea of nation was a way of secularizing the legitimacy of 
power (Pérez-Agote, 2006: Ch. 2). Moreover, as Bellah says, ‘every nation and every 
people come to some form of religious self-understanding’ (1991: 168). Some authors 
even speak of nationalism as the religion of modernity (Santiago, 2009). This means that 
the historical problem of separation between Church and State as a central enclave in the 
process of democratization of the national state is giving way to the new issue of the dif-
ferent degrees of separation between culture and religion in the autochthonous and immi-
grant population, as we have seen in speaking of the Islamic veil (Roy, 2010). The idea 
of secularism of the state cannot be the same in a situation where society is no longer 
homogeneous from a religious point of view. Other ways of thinking secularism are 
emerging, such as the notion of open secularism (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008: 43–49).
In second place, it is worth highlighting the, in some cases highly belligerent, 
responses by the Churches that have historically been entrenched in these countries to 
laws passed by Western European governments on divorce, abortion, same-sex marriage 
(and the adoption of children), assisted reproduction, euthanasia and stem cell research 
since the last quarter of the 20th century. This has led to a reappraisal of the stance of 
some of these Churches in relation to the public political sphere (Dobbelaere and Pérez-
Agote, in press).
Other religions, other countries
The rapid development process that occurred in a series of non-western countries 
employing certain elements of their traditional culture as a productive resource led some 
sociologists to examine the possibility that there are different ways to modernize. The 
pragmatic theory of multiple modernization processes represents a rupture with the idea 
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that a religious crisis is requisite to the attainment of modernity. Nowadays, the increas-
ingly relevant evidence that we are living in a globalized world and the progressive 
development of sociological analysis in more and more places throughout the world 
mean that sociology is raising the question of relationships between modernity and reli-
gion in relation to other non-Christian religions as well as non-western societies.
We find issues raised as a consequence of the latest waves of immigration, particu-
larly Muslim, reaching Western Europe countries (Kepel, 1987; Lamine, 2004; Roy, 
2005). Over the last few years, particularly following the attacks on 11 September 2001, 
which shook the world, much literature has been produced on Islamic fundamentalism. 
Some have even gone so far as to suggest possible incompatibility between Islam and the 
democratic organization of society. Particularly within political science, there has been 
an attempt to specify the conditions that a religion and a political organization must meet 
in order to produce the ‘twin tolerations’ – that is ‘the minimal boundaries of freedom of 
action that must somehow be crafted for political institutions vis-à-vis religious authori-
ties, and for religious individuals and groups vis-à-vis political institutions’ (Stepan, 
2000: 37). Casanova has compared ‘the contemporary global discourse on Islam as a 
fundamentalist and undemocratic religion’ with ‘the old discourse on Catholicism that 
predominated in Anglo-Protestant societies, particularly in the United States’ (Casanova, 
2005: 89).
Muslim emigration to Europe has had serious consequences. Some religious demands 
have provoked political conflict (Göle, 2006). Some cultural practices relating to sexual 
discrimination, ablation, the veil and arranged marriages have been widely discussed 
(Benhabib, 2002; Scott, 2007; Shweder et al., 2002). The issue of the Muslim veil in 
France and in Turkey has given rise to interesting studies (De Galembert, 2009; Gaspard 
and Khosrokhavar, 1995; Gökariksel and Mitchell, 2005). Fetzer and Soper (2005) com-
pare how their differing perceptions of the relationship between Church and State affects 
how well Muslim immigrants adapt in Great Britain, France and Germany. On the other 
hand, migration has effected among Muslims a profound cultural (Wieviorka, 1998) and 
religious (Cesari, 2004; Roy, 2004; Tietze, 2002) transformation, and a marked expan-
sion of the social functions of religion (Pérez-Agote and Santiago, 2009).
We should add that the World Values Survey has made it possible to analyse the reli-
gious situation in some countries for which there was no systematic sociological infor-
mation until now, which in turn makes it possible to effect comparative analyses. Gorski 
and Altinordu (2009: 65) give us a vision of the wide range of derived conclusions:
At first glance, the data hardly suggest decline; on the contrary, they indicate increase (Antoun 
& Hegland 1987, Sahliyeh 1990). This has led Berger and others to argue that the world is 
currently in a period of desecularization (Berger 2001; Karner and Aldridge 2004). Norris and 
Inglehart (2004; 2007) reject this view and develop an ingenious defense of secularization 
theory. On the one hand, they say, growing levels of existential security in certain countries and 
population segments have led to declining levels of religiosity; on the other hand, high levels 
of religiosity continue to be correlated with high rates of fertility. If aggregate levels of 
religiosity are increasing, they argue, this is the result of demographic forces, not of putative 
desecularization. But what about the Euro- American divide? This divide is explained by the 
strength of the welfare state (high security) in Europe and the persistence of laissez-faire 
liberalism (low security) in the United States.
12 Current Sociology Review 
Our main conclusion is that we should equip ourselves with analytical instruments with 
which to better understand the varied situations in which religion is found all across the 
world and over time. From the perspective of religious change, the notion of secularization 
should be treated in analytical terms thereby avoiding the suppositions of universality and 
transhistoricity, and the teleological pretension as well. This is necessary due to religion’s 
demonstrated capacity to adapt to change and, for this same reason, due to the variety of 
situations and processes that crop up in the world given this adaptive capability.
Towards an analytical framework of religious change
Dobbelaere (2002) designed an analytical framework at the three levels of macro, meso 
and micro. Societal secularization, the macro level, refers to relationships between soci-
ety and religion, and specifically to the process by which religion is pushed towards 
increasingly marginal zones of modern western societies. On the one hand, this produces 
a rupture in the unity of the traditional sacred cosmos and, on the other, the progressive 
liberation of specific spheres of social life from its former religious guardianship. This 
dimension of secularization enters with full force into the purview of the social differen-
tiation process (Dobbelaere, 2002: 29). Nevertheless, secularization, as a process for 
rationalizing the spheres of life, goes beyond economics to touch upon religion itself. 
Consequently, its organizational dimension, the meso level, inclines towards progressive 
rationalism and to its adaptation to changes; it is religion itself and its organization that 
are secularized and thereby adapt to the changes (Dobbelaere, 2002: 35). For this reason, 
this dimension has been called internal secularization by Luckmann (1967). The indi-
vidual dimension, the micro level, refers to the process whereby individuals’ religious 
beliefs and practices are decreasing substantially, and the capability of religion and a 
Church to determine their behaviour is also contracting.
The individual dimension of secularization tells us about the relationships between 
three institutional levels of religious life. The decline of religion in the individual sphere 
implies loss of importance for a specific institution made up of a specific historical reli-
gion and the corresponding Church; but it does not necessarily imply the collapse of 
religiosity (belief in God, religious experience, etc.); if religiosity survives while religion 
and the Church dwindle, individuals will have to construct their sense of life and verify 
it intersubjectively; religiosity would become deinstitutionalized.
Each of the three dimensions has a certain analytical, and even empirical, independ-
ence, as they can entail different and even contradictory processes. But they are also 
interrelated. Precisely by establishing the possible theoretical relationships between the 
three, we are building a very interesting set of instruments from an analytical point of 
view.
Religion, as a differentiated sphere, is a problematic 
category
Nowadays, the consideration of the European case as just one of many, rather than as the 
universal way which must be taken, affects not only the area of religion but also many 
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others. But some basic concepts of social science are taking longer than others to be 
reviewed; this is what is happening with religion. Peter van der Veer and Hartmut 
Lehmann point out that ‘it is important to realize that both “nation” and “religion” are 
conceptualized as universal categories in Western modernity and that their universality is 
located precisely in the history of the Western expansion. The modernity of the concept 
of the nation needs little discussion beyond mentioning the relationship between the 
ideas of “nation” and “ethnicity” as raised by the reference to “birth” in the very word 
nation. The modernity of the concept of religion, as applied in the modern era to 
Hinduism, Shintoism, Islam, but also Christianity, is much less an accepted truism in the 
social sciences’ (Van der Veer and Lehmann, 1999: 4; see also De Vries, 2008a, 2008b).
The most radical criticism of the very notion of religion is that made by Talal Asad. 
This author attempts to demonstrate that it is impossible for social science to make a 
universal, transhistorical definition of religion. To do this he takes as an example the 
definition given by Clifford Geertz (1973) as a system of symbols. In the 1980s, Asad 
had already criticized this definition with the accusation that ‘with its emphasis on mean-
ings … it omits the crucial dimension of power, … ignores the varying social conditions 
for the production of knowledge’. And ‘its initial plausibility derives from the fact that it 
resembles the privatised forms of religion so characteristic of modern (Christian) society, 
in which power and knowledge are no longer significantly generated by religious institu-
tions’ (Asad, 1983: 237). Twenty years later, Asad goes further and considers that con-
sidering religion as a separate sphere from social life has no meaning outside the notion 
of the secular. In an Islamic society it makes no sense to talk of religion as a separate 
sphere from politics. The secular is a creation of western societies as part of a moderniza-
tion project on a planetary scale. And this means that secularism is the western project to 
separate religion from the rest of social life; a project for both western and non-western 
societies. Asad is not only considering non-western societies but also the western ones. 
This separation has not always existed in the West, as the case in medieval Christianity 
shows (Asad, 2003: 1–17). But it is not clear either that it exists in contemporary western 
societies. He attempts to demonstrate this when he mentions the theoretical position of 
José Casanova on the relationships between religion and politics. ‘Casanova points to 
three elements in that thesis [secularization] all of which have been taken – at least since 
Weber – to be essential to the development of modernity: (1) increasing structural dif-
ferentiation of social spaces resulting in the separation of religion from politics, econ-
omy, science, and so forth; (2) the privatization of religion within its own sphere; and (3) 
the declining social significance of religious belief, commitment, and institutions. 
Casanova holds that only elements (1) and (3) are viable.’ For Casanova, ‘the deprivati-
zation of religion is not a refutation of the thesis if it occurs in ways that are consistent 
with the basic requirements of modern society, including democratic government. In 
other words, although the privatization of religion … is part of secularization, it is not 
essential to modernity.’ And Asad adds that Casanova’s position ‘is not an entirely coher-
ent one. For if the legitimate role for the deprivatized religion is carried out effectively 
… elements (1) and (3) are both … undermined.’ With the legitimate entry of religion 
into the debates about economy, education and science, the principle of structural dif-
ferentiation no longer holds. And with ‘the passionate commitments these debates 
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engender, it makes little sense to measure the social significance of religion only in terms 
of such indices as church attendance’ (Asad, 2003: 181–182; Casanova, 2006).
In much nineteenth-century evolutionary thought, religion was considered to be an early human 
condition from which modern law, science and politics emerged and became detached. In this 
[twentieth] century most anthropologists have abandoned Victorian evolutionary ideas, and 
many have challenged the rationalist notion that religion is simply a primitive and therefore 
outmoded form of the institutions we now encounter in truer form (law, politics, science) in 
modern life. For these twentieth- century anthropologists, it is not an archaic mode of scientific 
thinking, nor of any other secular endeavor today; it is, on the contrary, a distinctive space of 
human practice and belief which cannot be reduced to any other. From this it seems to follow 
that the essence of religion is not to be confused with, say, the essence of politics, although in 
many societies the two may overlap and intertwine. (Asad, 2002 [1982]: 115)
For Asad the relationships between religion and politics have never completely ceased to 
exist, since he considers that religion is always mixed with politics and power, even 
when these are constitutionally separate in western countries. Asad takes as his own the 
idea that ‘the public domain is not simply a forum for rational debate but an exclusionary 
space. … the public sphere is a space necessarily (nor just contingently) articulated by 
power’ (Asad, 2003: 183–184). And he quotes Robert Wolff (1969: 52) when he dis-
cusses the public sphere: ‘if an interest falls outside the circle of the acceptable, it receives 
no attention whatsoever and its proponents are treated as crackpots, extremists, or for-
eign agents’.
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Résumé 
La notion de laïcisation, considérée comme l’incompatibilité de la modernisation et de 
la religion, trouve son origine dans l’analyse du processus de modernisation des sociétés 
européennes occidentales. Ce processus a conduit à l’affaiblissement de la religion dans 
la société et à une progressive différenciation des sphères sociales, telles que la religion, 
la politique, la science, etc. Ces théories et ces catégories ont été généralisées pour en 
affirmer la portée universelle et décrire les processus de modernisation qui devraient 
survenir dans d’autre sociétés. Dès les premiers temps de son histoire, la sociologie 
a signalé des exceptions à la règle de la laïcisation. La première a été rapportée 
par Tocqueville : l’Exceptionnalisme américain. Ce fut ensuite la rapide croissance 
économique de certains pays de la région Asie-Pacifique (Japon, Corée, Singapour, etc.). 
L’intérêt des sociologues pour ces nouveaux pays a progressivement démontré la nature 
« eurocentrique » du concept. Le cas de l’Europe occidentale qui était autrefois la norme 
est devenu l’exception. La notion même de religion comme sphère sociale séparée est 
considérée comme ethnocentrique par certains chercheurs en sciences sociales. Malgré 
son eurocentrisme passé, la notion de laïcisation conserve néanmoins son utilité pour 
les sociologues. Elle permet de rendre compte des changements religieux européens 
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et ses instruments analytiques peuvent s’appliquer à d’autres cas pour en interpréter 
les similitudes et les différences avec le modèle européen occidental. Elle peut s’avérer 
encore plus utile pour l’étude de la grande migration internationale contemporaine. Si les 
sociologues souhaitent comprendre les nouvelles sociétés européennes occidentales, ils 
devraient utiliser les outils analytiques et non prédictifs du concept.
Mots-clés 
Modernisation, rationalité, religion, changement religieux, religiosité, culture religieuse, 
laïcisation, différenciation sociale
Resumen
El concepto de la secularización como una incompatibilidad entre la modernización y la 
religión deriva del análisis del proceso de modernización de las sociedades de Europa 
occidental . Este proceso dio lugar a una pérdida de peso de la religión en la sociedad 
y a una progresiva diferenciación de esferas sociales, como la religión , la política, la 
ciencia, etc. Después de este análisis, la categoría y la teoría se extendieron hasta asumir 
un alcance universal con la finalidad de describir los procesos de modernización que 
se producirían en otras sociedades. Desde el principio, la sociología ha proporcionado 
excepciones a la regla de la secularización. El primero fue observado por Tocqueville: 
el excepcionalismo estadounidense. Luego vinieron los procesos de rápido crecimiento 
económico de algunos países del Pacífico asiático (Japón, Corea, Singapur, etc.) 
Progresivamente, la entrada de nuevos países en el campo de interés de los sociólogos 
está mostrando el carácter eurocéntrico del concepto. El caso de Europa Occidental, 
que era la regla, se convirtió en la excepción. Incluso la noción de la religión como 
esfera social separada es considerada etnocéntrica por algunos científicos sociales. A 
pesar de su eurocentrismo originario, la noción de secularización conserva su utilidad 
para los sociólogos. Ha servido para dar cuenta de los cambios religiosos europeos y 
sus instrumentos de análisis pueden ser aplicados a otros casos, y puede ser útil para 
la interpretación de dichos casos, ya sea con respecto a la forma en que se adhieren 
al modelo europeo occidental, o cómo se diferencian de ella. Más aún, si tenemos 
en cuenta la gran migración internacional contemporánea. Si los sociólogos quieren 
entender las nuevas sociedades de Europa occidental, deben volver a aplicar esta 
versión analítica y no predictiva del concepto.
Palabras clave
Modernización, racionalidad, religión, cambio religioso, religiosidad, cultura, secularización 
religiosa, diferenciación social
